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EXTENDING THE GRASP OF THE DEAD HAND:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS OF
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
GEORGE L. HASKINS

j

Henry Frederick Howard, the Earl of Arundel and Surrey, was
a member of one of the oldest and most prominent families in
England. In 1647 he was faced with the serious problem of how to
provide for certain of his younger children through the disposition
of one of his estates, the barony of Grostock. Thomas, the Earl's
eldest son, was insane; yet by law upon his father's death he was
entitled to succeed to the Earldom, which required enormous supporting family wealth. The insanity of Thomas posed no small
problem to the Earl. Some provision had to be made for the possibility that Thomas might have a son who, if born, would in turn
succeed to the Earldom and therefore should have its attendant
estates. Moreover, there were also other children to be provided
for. The Earl's desire was that his next eldest son, Henry, should
have at least the income accruing from the barony of Grostock during Thomas' life; and if Thomas should die in Henry's lifetime
without leaving male issue then living and if Henry acceded to the
Earldom and its estates it was the Earl's intent that his third son,
Charles, should have the income from the barony of Grostock.1
In light of the complicated situation that prevailed in the
Howard family, it is not surprising that the Earl turned to Sir
Orlando Bridgman, a man much like himself, to draft a trust instruf Algernon Sydney Biddle Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania.
A.B., LL.B., Harvard University. Member of the Philadelphia Bar; also of the
Maine, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Bars. Fellow of the Royal Historical Society
(London) and member of numerous legal and historical associations in the United
States and abroad.
This Article is a revised and greatly expanded version of the First General
Address delivered by the author in Boston on November 5, 1977, before the American Society for Legal History.
The author is grateful to Alfred W. Putnam, Jr., a student at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, for invaluable assistance in the preparation of memoranda upon which portions of this Article are based.
1See generally Barry, The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 23 VA. L. REv. 538 (1937).
The Earl of Arundel was beset with an additional problem, apart from the insanity
of his eldest son. His estates had been confiscated by Parliament, sometime prior
to 1647, undoubtedly in retaliation for his support of Charles I, who was fighting a
pitched battle with Parliament over the religious and political issues that divided
England in the 1640's.

See id. 545-46.
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ment to accommodate the possibilities of descent. Bridgman, like
the Earl of Arundel, was a Royalist in a suddenly republican
England; he was also a brilliant lawyer who chose not to appear
before the courts during the Commonwealth period of 1649-1660,
but became instead a renowned conveyancer 2 The trust indenture
that Bridgman drafted became the basis for the celebrated legal
battle between Henry and his younger brother, Charles, now known
as The Duke of Norfolk's Case.3 Although the narrow issue decided
by Lord Nottingham was which of the two brothers was entitled: to
the barony of Grostock, The Duke of Norfolk's Case became famous,
or perhaps infamous, as the case in which the elements of the Rule
Against Perpetuities were first announced.
The Rule Against Perpetuities is among the oldest, most respected, and difficult to understand rules of the common law. The
purpose of this Article is not to illustrate the complexity of the
rule or its potential applicability to countless fact situations, but
rather to attempt to explain why the rule was thought necessary, and
how it came to be the method for determining what is, or is not, a
void perpetuity.
Although few lawyers today would be willing to describe themselves as certain of their ability to apply the rule to all possible
cases, most have little doubt about the rule's underlying policy
reasons. It is, after all, a rule against perpetuities and thus is generally considered to be one of the law's weapons against restraints
on the alienation of property. Indeed this has always been the
accepted explanation: "Ever since it first emerged in The Duke
of Norfolk's Case, it has been declared to be a rule in furtherance
of the alienability of property." 4 According to this view, a rule
favoring alienability was necessary by the end of the seventeenth
century because "'perpetuities' impeded the development of the
mercantile middle class by taking property out of the 'stream of
commerce.' "5 In a society that has been portrayed as changing
from a feudal to a capitalist order, the creation of a new rule restricting a landowner's ability to tie up his lands would, not surprisingly, be perceived as proof of such a transition. Land, the
2 See id. 546.

33 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
4 Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 708 (1955).
Simes questioned the continued validity of such a rationale, concluding that two
other justifications are superior: (1) the rule strikes a fair balance between property
rights of the present generation and those of future generations; (2) the rule ad-

vances the socially desirable policy that the wealth of the world should be controlled
by its living members and not by the dead. Id. 723.
5 Grimes, Runnymeade Revisited, 6 VAT. U. L. REv. 135, 136 (1972).
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source of all wealth in a pre-capitalist society, had to be made more
marketable. Once the major restraints on alienation were removed,
successful men would rise and the incompetent would fall, regardless
of the efforts or the prominence of their ancestors. This perception
of the rule as promoting a laissez-faire system is articulated in the
Restatement of Property: "It is obvious that limitations unalterably
effective over a long period of time would hamper the normal
operation of the competitive struggle. Persons less fit, less keen in
the social struggle, might be thereby enabled to retain property
disproportionate to their skills in the competitive struggle." 6
The traditional explanation of the origins of the rule is contradicted, however, by several compelling factors and is therefore
ripe for reexamination. Obviously the modem common law rule,
which states that an interest in property is void unless it will neces7
sarily vest, if at all, within a life in being and twenty-one years,
limits a testator's or grantor's ability to control the future ownership of his land, or other property; but the limit is a generous one,
as generous as most rational property owners would want. The
rule that was first announced by Lord Nottingham in The Duke
of Norfolk's Case had a different purpose. In fact, it was then
called a rule of perpetuities not a rule against perpetuities. The
Duke of Norfolk's Case was a clarification of ancient contradictory
assumptions, decisions and uncertainties with respect to how long
interests in landed property might last. Moreover, the decision
was not simply the resolution of an arcane point of property law:
the case marked the climax of a long struggle between the conveyancers who wanted more freedom for the landed classes to control their estates and the royal judges who stood firm against these
efforts for centuries. The conveyancers and their clients, not the
judges, were the ultimate victors.
This conclusion, which is so contrary to traditional assumptions
about the origins and purposes of the rule, is suggested by three
related inquiries. First, there is the question of interpreting the
economic, social, and political forces at work in seventeenth century
England. A generation ago it was fashionable to view this period
6 4 BESrATEmENT OF PRoPERTY, Introductory Note at 2132 (1944). It was
Professor Leach's view that the rule was intended to remove the "threat to the public
welfare from family dynasties

built

either on great landed estates or on great capital

wealth." Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,
65 HAnv.L. BEv. 721, 727 (1952).
7 The definitive modem version of the rule was formulated by John Chipman
Gray, the high priest of the Rule Against Perpetuities: "No interest is good unless

it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at
the creation of the interest." J. GnAv, THs RurE Ac,'Nsr PEIIPETun-ms (4th ed.
1942) § 201.

22

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

V 126:19
[Vol

as dominated by a rising middle class, wedded to capitalist ideas
such as free alienability of property. Now, however, a new climate
of opinion, has emerged, and an increasing number of historians
have accepted the theory that the dominant ethos of the seventeenth
century was that prevailing in a landed class generally hostile to
mercantile or capitalist ideas. Such a class might be expected to
take a jaundiced view of the free alienability favored by eager city
buyers. Second, an examination of the law existing before the new
rule was adopted reveals that the new rule did not limit a testator's
or grantor's options but rather afforded him greater flexibility by
enhancing, his ability to control future ownership of his property.
Third, the facts of The Duke of Norfolk's Case reveal the problems
that faced a great landowner before he had the rule to rely on and
how that rule alleviated those problems. An examination of these
three lines of inquiry leads to a rejection of the traditional theory
set forth by the Restatement and other classic authorities.
1. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND

The traditional theory about the origins of the Rule Against
Perpetuities was virtually unassailable a generation ago because it
matched nicely with the accepted historical interpretation of seventeenth century England, which was largely influenced by Marxist
views." The Marxist interpretation of the social struggle of the
1640's was championed by R. H. Tawney, a distinguished Socialist
historian who was instrumental in developing a new social and
economic historiography in Great Britain.9 According to Tawney
the Revolution in 1642 represented the triumph of the emerging
middle class' newer capitalist values over the older feudal structure.
Tawney saw the gentry as a rural middle class rising against the
increasingly decrepit feudal ruling class of the aristocracy, and thus
the .gentry, although a landed class, was given an unwarranted
capitalist hue.'0 The gentry's religion was Protestant, their political
S The Marxist analysis was itself a reaction to the Whig interpretation of seven-

teenth century English history, which had emphasized the advancement of political
and religious liberty. Typical examples of Whig historiography include G. TpxvzLYAN, TBE Two PA tFy Sysrm iN ENGLiSH PoLIIcAL HISToRy (1926); G. TEv-.
LYAN, BnrTiss HISTORY LN THE NINETEENm CENTURY (1782-1901)
(1922);
T. MAcu.&Y, Tim HISToRY OF ENGmLAND
SEcoND (1879).

FnoM THE AccEssioN or JAMs THE

9 Tawney's economic analysis of the seventeenth century was put forward in
R. Tawney, The Rise of the Gentry, 1558-1640, 11 Eco-. Hsr. REv. 1 (1941).
Other works by Tawney include B. TAwNEY, R1ELIoN AND TaH isE oF CAPrrAus
(1st ed. 1926); B. TAWNEY, HADHIN-rON'S INTEPrETATIN OF HIs Ac, (1942);
B. TAwNFY, THE AcnA~R.i
PROBLEm iN
16Hra Camvry (1912).
10 See Tawney, The Rise of the Gentry, 1558-1640, supra note 9, at 12-18.
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instincts were parliamentary and their economic views were mercantile or capitalist. These words are, of course, only labels, but
they serve to depict the Marxist perception of a class that might be
expected to include in its list of reforms a rule that would tie the
hands of great landed lords, who sought to protect their estates from
the economic misfortunes that were overtaking them as a class.
When the triumph of this bourgeois gentry came, capitalist values
triumphed as well. Given the favour that this historical interpretation enjoyed twenty-five years ago, 1 the rule, born in the early
1680's, explained itself. The traditional theory of the rule's origins
matched and, therefore, it had to be correct.
Unfortunately, the traditional theory no longer fits. The
Marxist interpretation was flawed from the outset and was soon
under attack. The first assault came in 1953, when Professor H. R.
Trevor-Roper argued with great force that the gentry was in fact a
declining class of small landowners driven to revolution by economic
reverses and the sullen resentment of an increasingly dominant
court.' 2 Trevor-Roper's view was ultimately too extravagant to be
maintained, but it did illustrate the weakness of Tawney's approach.
A more persuasive argument was put forward by J. H. Hexter in
1961.13 Hexter was convincing on two points that were devastating
to the effort to describe the seventeenth century as a period of
capitalist triumph. First, he suggested that there was nothing unusual about the movement of members of the middle or trading
classes into the landed class: "From the fourteenth century comes
that classical example of the rise of the middle class, the de la Poles
who went from trade at Hull to the Earldom of Suffolk in two
generations." '4 Pointing to the Pastons, Caxtons, and Chaucers,
Hexter concluded: "And so back through the centuries, as far as the
record will take us, we find the rising middle class making its way
out to the land, buying estates from aristocrats too unlucky or thriftless to hold them." 15 The newly triumphant class of the seventeenth century was nothing new. When new men did replace old,
1" Tawney initially swept many before him, and many an article was devoted
to the influence the gentry had on politics, economics and law. See, e.g., Stone,
The Anatomy of the Elizabethan Aristocracy, 18 EcozN. I-HsT. REv. (1948); Thorne,
Tudor Social Transformation and Legal Change, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 10 (1951).
12 Trevor-Roper, The Gentry 1540-1640, Ecox. HIsT. REv. (1953) (Supp. I).
13 J.

HITxi'n,

The Myth of the Middle Class in Tudor England, reprinted in
HsIx'ar, Storm Over the Gentry, reprinted

RBa"1'nAism.s N THsvoRY 71 (1962); J.
in EmE&AIPAis iN HsTony 117 (1962).

14J. HExTE,
at 79.

15 Id.

The Myth of the Middle Class in Tudor England, supra note 13,
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they were generally replacing the grandsons of men who had themselves been new.
Second, and more important, Hexter rejected the idea that the
gentry, however long they had been on the land, could be considered
as anything other than a landed class. The seventeenth century
merchants who bought land were diverting capital into an investment that promised no better than a five percent return. Had they
left their money in the city, they could have been assured of a ten
percent return.16 These individuals were willing to accept a lesser
income because they coveted the prestige that went with land. The
new men were more interested in behaving like landed gentlemen
than in earning the kind of profit that would lure a true capitalist.
The landed gentleman remained the ideal to which all propertied
classes aspired. The newly landed class was, on the whole, no more
nouveau riche than the aristocrats that Tawney would have us believe were their rivals.
Conrad Russell, another distinguished historian, has described
the difficulties faced by those who differentiated the landed gentry
from the landed aristocracy:
In economic terms, both had the same relationship to the
means of production: they lived off the profits of landownership .

.

.

. [B]y any test which can be devised they

must be regarded as being of the same class. There is no
justification for describing gentlemen as "middle class."
The term "middle class," and even more the term "bourgeois," are urban ones, and are very hard to fit into the class
structure of rural England, in which people were either
gentlemen or not gentlemen. 17
If the rising class was neither particularly new, nor particularly
capitalist, the basis for the traditional view of the rule's origins becomes even more doubtful. To this doubt must now be added two
additional factors.
First, the work of the economic historians has not gone for
naught. By the early years of the seventeenth century the landed
classes, regardless of the values to which they aspired, were clearly
undergoing considerable and continuing economic upheaval.
Whether rising or falling as individuals, the members of the landed
class as a whole were increasing in numbers. Lawrence Stone has
estimated a threefold increase between 1540 and 1640: "The number
16 Id.

96.

17 C. RUSSELL, TnE Crmss oF PARLAmENTS 17-18 (1971).
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of peers rose from 60 to 160; baronets and knights from 500 to
1,400; esquires from perhaps 800 to 3,000; and armigerous gentry
from perhaps 5,000 to 15,000." '8 The growth of the landed classes,
coupled with the availability of land that resulted from the confiscation of the monasteries and the frequent sale of crown lands to
finance foreign adventures, resulted in a highly speculative land
market. The market peaked between 1615 and 1620,19 but the
activity is illustrative of the economic insecurity of the entire period.
Stone concluded that "[a] landed aristocracy has rarely had it so
bad."

20

The crux of both Stone's and Hexter's analyses is that the
landed families were having great difficulty in holding on to their
estates. The instability of the families themselves is reflected by the
fact that of the 63 noble families existing in 1559, only one-third had
lasted without total or partial failure of succession on the eve of the
civil war in 1641 21 Those families that did not suffer from too
few children often had too many and daughters were particularly
unwelcome in light of the increasing expenses of marriage.2 2 Stone
points to the failure of landed fathers to provide for their families
as one of the reasons for the insecurity associated with the troubled
land market; in addition, "legal obstacles to breaking entails and
selling land were exceptionally weak, and moral objections to the
dismemberment of the family patrimony exceptionally feeble." 23
18 L.

STo-E,

THE CAusEs

OF Tim

ENGLISH REVOLVHON

1529-1642, at 72

(1972).

19 Id. 73.
20

L. STONE, TbE CRIsis OF THE AmsTocRAcY, 1558-1641, at 94 (abr. ed. 1967).
211d. 79.
22 Id. 81.
23 Id. 94. Hexter, relying on an earlier work of Stone's, described the moral
decline of one seventeenth century family:
Consider the sad case of Toby Palavicino. He inherited one of the
most magnificent landed fortunes in Cambridgeshire. His rake's progress
from the time he came into his own to the time he lay "in the Fleet for
debts" took sixteen years; but then Toby was handicapped. His prudent
father had laid an entail on the estate, and Toby was put to all the bother
of getting an Act of Parliament passed to break it. Had it not been for this
tiresome hindrance, he might have made it to jail several years sooner.
J. H-rXTzR, The Myth of the Middle Class in Tudor England, supra note 13, at 93.
The Palavacino case is an interesting one because the prudent father who sought to
use the entail to tie up his property was not an heir of an established family, but a
self-made Elizabethan financier and alum trade monopolist who had finally ascended
into the landed class. His urban, mercantile background did not carry with it any
loathing of entails; quite the contrary, rather than seeking a device to enhance the
alienability of his land, Palavicino Sr., like any great landowner, sought to save his
vast wealth from the irresponsibility of a reckless son. It is not clear why an act of
Parliament was required to break the entail, which normally could be barred by a
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The second consideration that must be evaluated is the date of
the rule itself. Although the great debate over the gentry has
concentrated on the economic instability of the pre-civil war period,
the Rule Against Perpetuities was propounded well after the
Cromwellian revolution, in 1681. The political mood of this later
period was distinctly conservative.
After the restoration of
Charles II to the throne in 1660, the landed classes entered a period
of relative stability and confidence. There was still considerable
political turmoil,24 but the dominant sentiment was Tory. The
Tory philosophy was pro-monarchy, but the King's cause was not
its sole or even pre-eminent guiding star. The Tory's first loyalty
was to the Church of England, and the political crises of the Restoration Parliament were generally the result of Royal efforts to tamper
with the established religion. 25 In addition, the Tory was generally a landed gentleman, with little love for merchants, the city
of London or capitalism. Even the Marxist historians have never
attempted to depict these men as capitalists. The liberal ideas the
Marxist-oriented historians sought to ascribe to a rising middle
class were in fact tied to the makers of the Revolution of 1642, who
were predominantly members of dissenting religious sects and held
more liberal political views. 26 The Tories of the post-revolutionary
period were the reaction to the Cromwellian revolution, and one
of these men, a prosperous Kent landowner, the Earl of Nottingham,
first enunciated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
recovery, unless the property was in trust and the trustees could not join without a
breach of trust. See generally L. STONE, AN ELIABETHAN: Sm HonAxro P ALvicmo

(1956).
24 The reigns of Charles II and James II, lasting jointly from 1660 until 1689,
were in fact noted for considerable political debate, and for the development of a
two party system. The Whig Party, generally tied to the older parliamentary tradition of Cromwell's Roundheads, was an amalgam of dissenting religions groups,
political liberals, merchant interests and out of favor courtiers. See generally
J. JoNEs, Tnn Fsr
Winos (1961). The Tory Party, dominant in the seventeenth
century, was Royalist, strongly Anglican, and landed. See generally Y. Famxo,
A HISonTY oF THE Tony P~mcr 1640-1714 (1924). For a good general work on the
political, and non-political, conflicts of the period, see D. OGr, ENGLA_ Nx T=.
REIGN Or Cmrms II (2d ed. 1956).
2
5 Modem historians have persuasively demonstrated that Tory opinion was
separable from Royalist opinion, and that it was the Tory majority in the House of
Commons that rejected royal attempts at religious toleration, first in 1660-61, and
then more decisively in 1673. Tory hostility to Catholicism led to the temporary
decline of the party in the wake of the Popish plot hysteria and to a momentary
majority for the Whigs in 1679-81. In light of the Tory hostility to toleration of
either Catholicism or dissenting Protestantism, the effort of James II to tolerate both
groups resulted, not surprisingly, in the overthrow of the Stuarts. For the best
discussion of the Tory point of view, see D. WrrcomE, CHArs II AND r
CAvAaL= Housa OF Com.MoNs 1663-1674 (1966).
26 G. DAvIEs, THE EALY Smr AnTs, 1603-1660, 127-30 (2d ed. 1959).
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The Rule Against Perpetuities therefore seems to be the work
not of incipient capitalists but of landed gentlemen anxious to
preserve the positions of their families in a society that had recently
passed through a turbulent period. If this explanation of the
rule's origins is true, the question remains why the landed gentry
should want a rule against perpetuities. Would they not prefer a
rule that might give a landed gentleman a little more freedom to
tie up land? Clearly they would, and that is precisely what Lord
Nottingham gave them.
II. THE LAW BEFORE The Duke of Norfolk's Case
In the beginning was the land. Its importance in the history
of England and English law continued to grow from the Middle
Ages until at least the end of the eighteenth century. Land was the
basis of economic subsistence, wealth, family solidarity, social status
and above all security. Feudal doctrine prescribed that land should
be held of an overlord, and ultimately of the king, so that rules
with respect to its transfer and descent tended to reflect policies of
the crown embodied in the common law of the king's courts. It
fell to the royal courts to formulate rules that sought to balance the
conflicting interests and desires of the king and of his powerful
landed subjects, who had a strong and ingrained sense of what they
should be permitted to do with, and how they might dispose of,
their land and property rights. The rules that restrained the landowners, however, were rigid and sometimes complex. Occasionally
they required modification, as by the Statute De Donis, which in
27
1285 created the fee tail.

Although the royal judges often declared that land should be
freely alienable, that alienability was limited by a recognized calculus of estates that had evolved well before the end of the reign of
Edward I in 1307. Thus, by the end of the thirteenth century, a
man could typically convey land in the form of a life estate, a fee
tail or a fee simple. Also, while retaining the underlying seisin and
future right to repossession, a grantor might convey the possession
of land for a term of years gratis, or for a stated rent. Within this
calculus, however, there were restrictions on the conditions a man
could impose on the grantee of his land. Some of these restrictions
resulted from incapacities of thought connected with the elusive
concept of seisin,2 8 while others resulted from royal policies hostile
2

7 Statute De Donis Conditionalibus,13 Edw. I, c. 1 (1285).

28 See text accompanying note 39 infra.
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to the accumulation of large estates which, as the basis for private
armies, might threaten the power of the king.29 Paradoxically, the
first major challenge to the free alienability of land came when the
Statute De Donis created a new estate that was in the beginning not
truly alienable, the fee tail referred to above. The fee tail became
unbarrable and could be conveyed by one in possession for his life
only; then it would pass in any event successively to the family of
the original grantee, generation after generation, until the lines ran
out. The statutory unbarrable fee tail replaced the fee simple conditional,30 and it lasted for centuries, despite grave dissatisfactions
and attempts to circumvent it. Increasingly during those years the
problem became the practical one of marketability: a grantee might
take land in good faith believing it to be freely alienable as the
equivalent of a fee simple only to discover subsequently that the land
had been entailed several generations back, that the lineal descendents of a prior grantee had died out, and that now a valid claim
might be asserted by the heirs of the reversioner or remainderman
under the original grant. Apparently, so much of the land in
England had been tied up in entails of this sort that it became unsafe
to take a conveyance lest one lose it in the manner described.3 1 The
judges solved this problem in Taltarum's Case 32 through the judicially recognized fiction that permitted a tenant in tail to break the
entail, together with ensuing remainders and reversions, by "suffering a recovery." 3 Through the device of the common recovery the
fee tail became freely alienable by the person in possession and that
29 The protection of the king's interests played a major role in the development
of a rule against perpetuities. The greatest danger faced by many medieval kings
was the overmighty subject and the preservation in perpetuity of a single family's
financial base in land and men that might raise up a power capable of challenging
the Crown itself.
The king's own financial interests were at stake as well. A perpetuity kept land
out of the market and discouraged trade, thus limiting the king's revenues and taxes
on the one hand and diminishing productivity on the other. POwEL-L, RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY, PpnvaARY Dns-r 5 n.83; PowExL, 5 THE LAw OF RFAL PRoPERTY
ff 75911] at 538 (1971). More importantly, a real perpetuity would deprive the
king of the feudal incidents that were so vital to the royal treasury. This was
Bacon's argument against perpetuities in Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep.

270 (1595).

3o The courts had declared the fee simple conditional to be freely alienable
after the birth of issue. 1 IBESEATEmENT OF PNoPERTY § 70 (1936). The process
by which the fee tail became "unbarrable" is described in 3 W. HOLiSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH L&-v 115-18 (1935).
31 See 1 RESTATEMENT OF FROPERTY (Appendix) (re dower rights).
3212 Edw. IV 19, pl 25 (1472).
Ingenious lawyers had earlier discovered
other methods of evading De Donis in certain situations. See 3 W. HoLDswoRT,
supra note 30, at 118-20.
33 For a concise explanation of the procedure of the common recovery, see

A.

CAsNER & W. LEACH, CAsEs AND TEXT ON PROPFmTY

256-58 n.13 (2d ed. 1969).
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person could effectively convey an estate in fee simple absolute. 34
Under the Tudors, landowners and their increasingly imaginative
conveyancers were persistent in their efforts to establish long-lasting
settlements of land, often by attempting variations on the basic fee
tail. One such effort was the attempt to resurrect the unbarrable
fee tail by adding a condition to the effect that any attempt to break
the fee tail would immediately terminate the estate of the person
attempting the disentailment. These conveyances were held invalid
in several decisions in the early seventeenth century as repugnant
to the fee tail; they were even described as perpetuities because, if
given effect, the fee tail might then last forever-a continuity whose
existence belonged only to God.3 5 Another example of the effort to
circumvent the vulnerability of the fee tail was the creation of an
equivalent to the estate tail in a long term for years. Unfortunately for the landowners, the courts struck this devise down at
an early date, declaring that a term for years could not be entailed
and that the first taker became the owner of the entire term.36
At about the time that Taltarum's Case had dealt a death blow
to the fee tail as a device for tying up land, a second major threat
to ready marketability arose. Assisted by the new types of estates
made possible by the Statute of Uses3 7 in 1535, conveyancers had
also begun to tie up land through contingent remainders. Conveyances of successive interests to living persons-characteristically,
vested remainders or reversions following estates for life or in fee
34

Taltarurs Case is important because just as the mortmain acts of the time
of Edward I sought to keep the Church from accumulating large areas of land, the
development of the common recovery was similarly inspired by the growing concentration of great estates in the hands of powerful families. After Taltarurm's Case,
the fee tail could in theory last forever in the heirs of the owner to whom it was
sold or given, but at any time the current owner might suffer a common recovery
and thereby transfer the land back into the mainstream of commerce.
35 Corbet's Case, 1 Co. 83b, 21 Eng. Rep. 985 (1599), quoted in G. CAnR,
REPoRTs oR CAUsEs xN CHANCERY 11 (1820).
36 Sanders v. Cornish, Cro. Car. 230, 79 Eng. Rep. 801 (1631). By the end
of the sixteenth century the conveyancers, spurred on by their worried landed employers, sought to create unbarrable entails through a clause of cesser. Gray notes
an interesting contemporary reaction to this sort of perpetuity that has been attributed
to Lord Bacon:
There is started up a device called perpetuity; which is an entail with an
addition of a proviso conditional tied to his estates, not to put away the
land from the next heir; and, if he do, to forfeit his own estate. Which
perpetuities, if they should stand, would bring in all the former inconveniences of entails that were cut off...
7 BcoN's Woars 491 (Spedding's ed. 1859) quoted in J. GRA.Y, supra note 7,
§ 141.2. The courts were not fooled, however, and Professor Yale has suggested
that they disposed of this threat by Coke's time. D. YALE, INRaoDucTioN TO 1
.. 's CHAN CERY CASES ]xxiv (1957). See Corbet's Case, 1 Co. 83b,
LoRD Norrn
21 Eng. Rep. 985 (1599); Mary Portington's Case, 10 Co. 35a, 77 Eng. Rep. 976
(1614).
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tail-were countenanced in the middle ages. Six hundred years ago,
these basic future interests, which take effect whenever and however
the immediately preceding estate ends and with no other condition
attached, were viewed as present interests, with enjoyment postponed.
It was otherwise with remainders granted on a contingency or
to an unascertained person. Contingent remainders were indeed
future interests, but the law gave them scant recognition until the
sixteenth century,38 for it was not perceived how an owner could be
seised of such a freehold interest if he were unknown, or if a condition were attached to his taking it. From this conception there
developed two related rules, fortified by such other considerations
as the strong preference for alienability; and it became law that a
contingent remainder could be destroyed by persons having actual
seisin, or the remainder would fail if the condition were not satisfied
in time for it to vest in possession or in interest before the preceding
estate, usually an estate for life, ended. These two rules are respectively known as the artificial and natural destructibility of
contingent remainders.
A contingent remainder in realty, unless in trust and hence
equitable, was subject to destruction if the condition attached to it
had not been satisfied at the termination of the preceding or "supporting" freehold estate, typically a life estate. Even though the
condition might be subsequently met, or the grantee be later identified, the common law refused to tolerate a gap in seisin; and a gap
would appear if a condition, express or implied, attached to
such an estate had not been met. This reasoning required what
has been referred to above as natural destructability. 9 Only those
holding an estate for life, in fee tail, or in fee simple could be seised.
Notwithstanding the legal thrust and counter-thrust that surrounded the fee tail,
the landowners were aware that the law was doing their work. If many a landed
gentleman wished to guard against the mismanagement of a foolish heir, most of

them also realized that a genuine perpetuity posed the danger of depriving a family
of economic flexibility in selling land when changing economic circumstances required re-investment or ready cash. The worries created by the spectre of a genuine
perpetuity, such as an unbarrable entail, are reflected in a bill brought in the House
of Commons in 1597 which found that such perpetuities
[E]ngender discorde in all families where they light and drawe the whole
kindred into faction, but doe also make Children disobedient and parents
unnatural ....

[M]any purchasers are often and usually defrauded by

such [perpetuities] and the owners of inheritance of landes restrayned from
raysinge money by sales or from exchanginge Lands for lands upon any
occasion whatsoever....
Holdsworth, An Elizabethan Bill Against Perpetuites, 35 L.Q. lRv. 258, 258 (1919).
3727 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535).
38 J.GRa&, supra note 7, §§ 134-35 (4th ed. 1942).
39 See, e.g., White v. Summers, [1908] 2 Ch. 256.
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The rule had evolved from the practicalities of the feudal system,
which demanded that someone should always be seised or "sitting
upon" the land and be responsible for feudal dues; but the reasons
for the rule had become encysted in the tissues of judicial thought,
and, aided by conceptions favorable to freer aienability, the rule
was relentlessly applied. Conveyancers who hoped that an equitable
contingent remainder, transformed by the Statute of Uses into a corresponding legal estate, would be indestructible were dismayed to
find the judges deciding that even those remainders were equally
subject to destruction. 40 The same pressures in favor of alienability,
supported by convictions as to the fragility of non-vested remainders
also permitted contingent remainders to be destroyed by a conveyance from a life tenant to the owner of the next vested estate, usually
the reversioner, thereby squeezing out the intervening contingent
remainder if the condition had not yet been met. This process,
known as merger, is what has been referred to above as artificial
41
destructibility.
To be safe from the common law rules that continued to emphasize the anachronistic concepts of seisin, a seventeenth century
landowner might convey land to trustees in such a way that the
Statute of Uses would not transform the equitable interest into a
corresponding legal estate, for example, by conveying the interest
with active duties. Seisin would be in the trustees, and the gaps,
fatal at law, were immaterial in equity insofar as an equitable
contingent remainder was concerned. Apparently, however, landowners were reluctant to give up the legal ownership of property
and transfer it to trustees, for they would then lack the power to
break the trust and to sell in a rising market for profit or to meet
current financial needs. Nevertheless, the trust device was there,
and it continued to be a potential threat to free alienability of land
insofar as the two rules of destructibility were concerned. As will
appear, conveyancers in the seventeenth century turned to the use
of terms for years, where their clients could retain the basic seisin
and yet create future interests-whether absolutely or, more usually,
in trust-within a term.
By the early seventeenth century the struggle for free alienability had met with considerable success. 42 Destructibility of fees tail
40 Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (1595).

See, e.g., Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wins. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1670).
Other evidence of legal rules favoring free alienability can be found in the
articulation of a rule recognized in D'Arundel's Case, 3 BnCTON'S Nots Boor,
case 1054 (F. Maitland ed. 1887) (1225), and canonized in Shelley's Case, I Co.
93b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (1581). The Rule in Shelley's Case prescribed that in
41
42
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by common recovery and of legal contingent remainders by merger
and failure to vest had become so effective a weapon that it was fast
becoming a rule against perpetuities itself, particularly because certain of the new types of legal executory interests made possible by
the Statute of Uses were considered destructible as contingent remainders.43 Quite unexpectedly in 1620, the Court of King's Bench
re-emphasized in Pells v. Brown that there was a generic and not
merely verbal distinction between executory interests and contingent
remainders. The judges held that an executory interest could not
be destroyed, despite a strongly worded dissent that the majority's
holding would lead to a "mischievous kind of perpetuity." 45 It
should be emphasized that for these purposes the word perpetuity
connoted an inconvenient fettering of property in the sense that the
interest created in a grantee might be inalienable for too long a
time.46
The facts of Pells v. Brown were relatively simple.4 William
Brown Sr. left his farm to his second son Thomas, but if Thomas
should die without issue in the lifetime of William Sr.'s first son,
William Jr., the farm was to go to the latter. Thomas apparently
believed he owned a fee tail and he did what the law encouraged
people to do when their land was tied up in fee tail: he suffered a
common recovery to convert the fee tail into a fee simple and subsequently devised the land to the Pells family. His death without
issue in William Jr.'s life raised the question whether the future
interest of his brother William was good, or whether preference for
free alienability would be given free reign with the termination
certain situations a conveyance to a grantee for life and then to his heirs gave the

grantee not a life estate and a remainder in unascertained heirs but a remainder in
himself and hence, by merger, a fee simple. A comparable rule emerged from the
doctrine of worthier title. See 3 REsTATEmENT OF POPERTY § 314(1) (1940).
43 See J. GRAY, supra note 7, § 159.

Devices for tying up land had not been

disposed of altogether, however. The use of trusts was possible, although this could
require transfer of the seisin as well.

After the Statute of Uses it was possible as

well to create contingent remainders after a term of years, but they were recognized
only as springing executory interests.
44

Cro. Jac. 592, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620).

45 Id,

79 Eng. Rep. at 506.
OF PROP~nTY, Part 1, Introductory Note (1944).
See
T. ScRurroN, LAND IN FErTEns 123-33 (1886).
47 The report for Fells v. Brown indicates that the case was an action in
replevin for the taking of three cows at Rowdham. Apparently Pells' cows were
taken by William Brown under a claim that the cows were grazing on his freehold.
Pells responded that the freehold in fact belonged to him rather than to William
Brown, since William's brother Thomas had previously sold Pells the land. Williams
answer was a claim that he had a valid executory interest in the land and that
Thomas was not free to convey the property. The replevin issue thus had to be
resolved by deciding whether Pells or Brown owned the freehold.
464
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of William Jr.'s interest by the common recovery. The Court of
King's Bench held first that Thomas did not have a fee tail but a
fee simple subject to an executory interest because the failure of
Thomas' issue was to be determined at a specific point in time,
namely in William Jr.'s life.4s This was not so surprising. What
astounded the lawyers of the time was that the court subsequently
held that William Jr.'s interest was an indestructible executory
interest.
The result in Pells v. Brown was truly revolutionary. J. S.
Grimes, believing the case to be a victory for the landed interests,
described it as "the new Runnymeade." -0 Whatever one thinks
of Grimes' interpretation of Magna Carta, there can be no doubt
that Pells v. Brown gave the conveyancers much more flexibility to
control the future ownership of land than they possessed since the
fee tail was held to be destructible in Taltarum's Case. Doderidge,
one of the judges on the King's Bench dissented strongly: "[T]he
recovery should bar William; for he had but a possibility to have a
fee . . . which is destroyed by this recovery before it came in esse:
for otherwise it would be a mischievous kind of perpetuity which
could not by any means be destroyed." 50
Doderidge may have overstated his case, perhaps because he
thought any abandonment of the principle of destructibility of
future interests, whether by common recovery or by merger and
failure to vest, was a surrender to the concept of a perpetuity.
Farmer Brown had not, however, tied up his land perpetually.
What he had done was to limit Thomas' ability to dispose of the
land until either William Jr. died or Thomas himself died leaving
issue. Thomas or his issue when in possession could have easily
destroyed the fee tail if it had been one. William Jr.'s interest in
turn would necessarily come into being within his own lifetime
because he had to survive his brother. William Jr.'s interest was
not the sort of future interest that would continue forever as a perpetual clog on the estate. Only Thomas' hands were tied.
Paralleling the development that culminated in Pells v. Brown
was another that climaxed in Manning's Case 51 in 1609. Before
Manning's Case was decided the owner of a term of years who at48
On the other hand, if the devise had indicated no specific time at which the
existence vel non of issue had to be determined, the failure of issue would have
been indefinite and then Thomas would have owned a fee tail, which would terminate
when his line actually died out.
49 Grimes, supra note 5, at 140.
50 Cro. Jac. at 506, 79 Eng. Rep. at 506.

518 Co. 94b (1609).
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tempted to divide the term into a life estate in one person and
what appeared to be a remainder in another, would find that the
remainder was void. The conception of freehold estates and the
dignity that lay behina1 that conception was, roughly speaking, that a
life estate engulfed a term for years; therefore, the effect of the
pre-1609 view was that the life tenant owned the entire term, and
after his death, he might provide for the disposition of whatever
remained of the term. A grantor was thus not permitted to fetter
alienability even within a term for years.
In Manning's Case the judges of the Court of Common Pleas
considered whether Edward Manning could leave an interest in a
fifty-year term to his wife, Mary, and then to Matthew Manning.
They decided that the life tenant did have a complete interest in
the term under the traditional analysis, but it was subject to the
condition that upon Mary's death Matthew's interest was not a void
remainder but a valid executory interest. Even though Manning's
Case involved a leasehold interest in a term for years, that is a
chattel real, rather than real property, conveyancers seized on the
decision as a method of tying up their clients' land, so that a freehold
owner might theoretically create a 500-year term in one person with
succeeding indestructible executory interests in others in such a
manner as to fetter the land until the full expiration of 500 years.
In fact, so long a term was very unusual: the commonplace grant
seems to have been a term that would last for the lives of several
named individuals, and shift successively as executory interests on
conditions operative at the deaths of one or more of those persons.52
Gray has pointed out r3 in his review of decisions concerning
perpetuities in the eighty years preceding The Duke of Norfolk's
Case that with two exceptions 5" all the decisions relating to the
growth of the Rule Against Perpetuities involved terms for years
and not freehold estates. Hence, the conveyancers' chosen arena
was one in which they had greater apparent ability to tie up land.
This was their "out" after Pells v. Brown.
Several reasons may be advanced for the increasing use of terms
for years, rather than freehold estates by conveyancers as a technique
of estate planning. First, considerable doubt persisted as to the
soundness of Pells v. Brown, not only among conveyancers but
among the judges. The case was a sudden and unexpected de52 See generally Gray, supra note 7, at §§ 161-68.

5 Id. § 160.
54 Snow v. Cutler, 1 Lev. 135, 1 Keb. 752, 83 Eng. Rep. 335 (1664); Taylor v.
Biddal, 2 Mod. 289, 86 Eng. Rep. 1078 (1678), see J. GR&Y, supra note 7, at §§ 165,
172.

19771

THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

parture from pre-existing law, which as stated had considered executory interests to be as freely destructible as contingent remainders6 5 To hold that an executory interest could not be barred
by a recovery "went down with the judges like chopped hay." 6
Chief Justice Treby remarked: "These executory interests had not
long been countenanced when the judges repented them; and if it
were to be done again, it would never prevail." 57 After Manning's
Case, which recognized executory interests within a term for years,
those interests would not be destructible 'l or even void and clearly
not destructible by analogy to freehold estates since in the case of a
term the seisin lay with the remainderman or the reversioner. A
second possible reason for the growing use of terms and future
interests within them may relate to the fact that the reversioner
who created the term usually retained the fee in himself and also the
title deeds, which would enable him to sell or mortgage the basic
title, subject to the outstanding possessory rights of the owners of
the term.
Sir Orlando Bridgman used the device of a term for years followed by an indestructible executory interest when he drafted the
trust indenture to dispose of the barony of Grostock. Bridgman
undoubtedly used this method to effectuate the Earl of Arundel's
wishes with a certain degree of confidence, borne of his experience
as a conveyancer and the sturdiness of the precedents that followed Manning's Case. Even Bridgman would have been somewhat
surprised, had he lived, at the extent to which a seemingly straightforward trust instrument was expanded into one of the truly important cases of English legal history.
III. The Duke of Norfolk's Case
As previously noted, the judges of the king's courts had been
fighting against perpetuities long before the first enunciation of a
rule of perpetuities in The Duke of Norfolk's Case. The weapon
they had at hand to oppose perpetuities in the two centuries prior
to The Duke of Norfolk's Case was principally destructibility of
fee tails by the common recovery and of contingent remainders by
merger and failure to vest. The early seventeenth century had produced decisions that seriously weakened the effectiveness of this
55 See 3. GnAuy, supra note 7, at § 121.7.

56 Scattergood v. Edge, 12 Mod. 278, 281, 88 Eng. Rep. 1320, 1322 (1699).
Id. 287.
a discussion of Manning's Case, see text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
J. GAY, supra note 7, at § 152.
57

58For
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weapon, principally through the recognition of indestructible executory interests. Not only were these decisions unpopular with
many of the judges, 9 they caused considerable confusion concerning
the state of the law.60 By 1681 both conveyancers and judges were
unhappy with the law as it then stood, and both groups found in
the 1647 trust indentures of the Earl of Arundel a case that seemed
certain to resolve the question that divided them: the definition of
what constituted a perpetuity.
Briefly the case was this. The Earl of Arundel and Surrey
created two trust indentures that were intended to provide for his
family and, more particularly, to guard against the consequences of
the insanity of his eldest son Thomas. 6' After reserving life estates
to himself for life and then to his widow the Earl gave to named
trustees a term of 200 years, which was followed by remainders to
his younger children. Under the trust the term, or more practically
the income derived from the barony of Grostock, was to go to the
Earl's second son, Henry, and his issue during the life of the eldest
son, Thomas; but if Thomas should die without leaving issue in the
lifetime of Henry and if, further, Henry should become the Earl by
inheritance, Henry was to have no further rights to the rents and
profits, which were then to go to the third son, Charles. These, in
simplest form, were the limitations of the trust: an absolute
equitable interest in the term in Henry 62 followed by what Lord
Nottingham called a springing executory interest in Charles, con59 Pells v. Brown and Manning's Case were obviously the two most troublesome
precedents.
60 In Snow v. Cutler, I Lev. 135, 1 Keb. 752, 83 Eng. Rep. 335 (1664) the
judges seem to have been "in great doubt," yet they did agree that an executory
devise "may well be allowed to take place within the compass of a life, but not
after a dying without issue, for that would make -a perpetuity." I Lev. at 136, 83
Eng. Rep. at 336. One of the judges stated that "if an ordinary contingency . . .
may determine within one life, or such time, it's good." 2 Keb. at 300, 84 Eng.
Rep. at 187. It is not clear from the report whether dying without issue was
intended to mean definite failure of issue, which would not have presented a
perpetuity problem under the old law, or indefinite failure, which would have presented a perpetuity under the law before The Duke of Norfolk's Case.
61 The contingency of the insane Thomas' having issue, which troubled the Earl
of Arundel, posed no problem for his second son: at the death of his father, Henry
arranged to have his elder brother locked up in Padua under circumstances where
he was certain not to have an heir. Henry did provide one benefit for his unfortunate sibling. He secured a special act of Parliament restoring to the Howards the
family title of "Duke of Norfolk" which had been lost a few generations earlier.
Thomas thus became a titled prisoner and at his death his brother Henry became
Duke of Norfolk. Barry, supra note 1, at 543-45.
62 There could be no fee tail in a term. Although the first limitation to Henry
and the male heirs of his body was an attempt to create the equivalent of a fee tail
male in personal property, Henry took an absolute interest and Charles a succeeding
executory interest.
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ditioned on the happening of two events which would have to occur
within Charles' life if he were to take anything.6"
When Henry in due course succeeded to the Earldom and became Duke of Norfolk, he suffered a common recovery in an effort
to terminate his brother Charles' interest. Charles then brought a
bill in Chancery to demand the benefit of the term, because the
specified conditions to his taking had been fulfilled. The Duke
resisted the claim on the ground that the gift to Charles was in the
nature of a perpetuity and hence void. This was the issue presented
to Lord Chancellor Nottingham to decide: was the gift to Charles a
perpetuity? If so, Henry could lawfully retain the interest in the
barony of Grostock given him by his father's trust, because the gift
to Charles was void.
The issue that divided the judges in this case was not whether
perpetuities should be allowed, but what perpetuities were, or more
exactly, whether this case presented a perpetuity. On one side it
could be argued that the contingency upon which the disposition
of the property turned was certain to happen within a short period
of time, so it was foolish to refer to the gift as a perpetuity. On
the other side, it might be argued that the type of interest created
should be found destructible; otherwise the all important preference
for free alienability would be compromised. This second argument
was the traditional approach to perpetuities and convinced the
common law judges Lord Nottingham consulted. The first argument, however, convinced the Chancellor, and was the one that has
become the basis for the modern Rule Against Perpetuities. The
argument between the two perceptions of what constituted a perpetuity runs through the entire case.
Charles' claim was a sympathetic one, particularly in light of
the obvious intent of his father, but the opinion of most of the
lower court judges who first heard the case was that Charles' interest
was void. In December of 1677 Serjeants Pemberton 64 and Maynard 0 gave opinions in favor of Henry. Maynard, unlike Pember63 There were successive contingent remainders to other younger brothers, which
need not concern us here, and were in any event held invalid by both Lord Nottingham and the common law judges. See Barry, supra note 1, at 546-47.
64 Pemberton was later to advise Nottingham when the case reached Chancery.
See text accompanying notes 70-73 infra.
65 Maynard's career is an interesting one. He was in his seventies at the time
he heard the case and had been an active supporter of Cromwell during the Civil
War. His political sympathies left him in minor posts during the Restoration period,
but he lived to see his "good old cause" triumphant again when James II was
ousted in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Maynard served William and Mary as
Chancellor until his death at eighty-eight. See J. CAMPBELL, V LIvIs OF TBE
CHANCELLORS OF ENGLAND 1-35 (1857).
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ton, was unsure, but ultimately held that Henry's resort to the
common recovery was dispositive: "By the Recovery suffered by
H. H. all the Intails [to Charles and his younger brothers] are
barred, and consequently the waiting of the Term upon the inheritance destroyed." 66 This view was later supported by Sir
William Jones, who recognized the previous victories of the conveyancers but rejected them: "[T]he Judges say, as I have often
heard them say in other Cases (That if Matthew Manning's Case was
now to be adjudged, it would not be so adjudged.)" 67 The early
judges were not unanimous however. Sir William Ellis, an aging
Cromwellian, took the conveyancers' side and stood by Pells v.
Brown. He was impressed with the general sensibility of the estate
plan drawn up by Sir Orlando Bridgman. "The Equity and Justice
of this Trust carries much Weight with me." 68
Any effort to link these decisions to the economic or political
views of the judges is difficult. All of them were landed gentlemen
from prominent families. Pemberton was a Tory with connections
to the Court. Ellis, the only judge who supported the tying up of
land, was a Whig, and therefore connected to the urban, mercantile
interests that, according to the traditional interpretation of the
origins of the rule, opposed efforts to keep land out of commerce.
Maynard and Jones were likewise Whigs and both voted to void
Charles' interest. By the time the case reached Chancery two more
votes against Charles had been recorded, this time by prominent,
perhaps even extreme, Court Tories.6 9 The issue therefore seems to
have been approached less from a political than a legal and practical standpoint.
The case finally came before the Chancellor, the Earl of Nottingham, in 1681. Nottingham was so conscious of the importance
of the case that he called upon the three chief judges of the common law courts to advise him. 70 As noted above, one of these judges,
Sir Francis Pemberton of the Court of King's Bench, had first heard
the case five years before. Since then he had been promoted to
King's Bench, apparently to lead the assault on the Whigs, now in
disarray after the collapse of their effort to exclude James, the Duke
Ch. Cas. at 3, 22 Eng. Rep. at 932.
Id. at 5, 22 Eng. Rep. at 933.
68 Id. at 12, 22 Eng. Rep. at 938.
69 See the opinions of North and Montagu, discussed in text accompanying

66 3
67

notes 77-84 infra.

70 The importance of the case cannot be overstated. Nottingham noted that
"there are so many Short-hand Writers, that nothing can pass from us here, but it
is presently made publick." 3 Ch. Cas. at 38, 22 Eng. Rep. at 954.
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of York and heir to the throne, from succession because of his
Catholic sympathies. 71 The King was prepared to strike at his
enemies, and Pemberton was considered to be a man "on whom the
Court could rely." 72 He was not to last long on the King's Bench,
Tory though he was, because he could not match the fury of the
King. Pemberton was removed in late 1683, apparently for want of
zeal in moving against the Whig Lord Russell.7" The other two
judges of the common law courts were not as familiar with the case
as Pemberton was. Sir William Montagu, Lord Chief Baron of the
Exchequer, had a career similar to Pemberton's. 74 Originally
thought to be a reliable supporter of the Crown, he was unwilling
to follow it in the mid 1680's as its positions became increasingly
extreme. Montagu was removed from the bench in 1686, for
failure to back unreservedly the dispensation power the King sought
to strengthen the dissenters and Catholics. Sir Francis North,
Chief Judge of Common Pleas, was the most extreme of all three of
these judges, and by 1681 he was the Crown's favored judge, more
trusted than the Chancellor himself.75
The fact that the three common law judges in The Duke of
Norfolk's Case opposed Nottingham's decision and that before Lord
Nottingham was finally affirmed by the House of Lords in 1685, he
was reversed in 1683, provides convincing evidence of the uncertainty that beclouded the opinions of the judges as to what constituted a perpetuity. The unsettled state of the law prevailing in
the decades before 1681, and the misunderstanding and inconsistencies of the judges' thinking, are perhaps best illustrated by
the separate opinions of the three common law judges whom Lord
Nottingham asked to be associated with him in The Duke of Norfolk's Case. As stated, all three disagreed with Nottingham on
71

The exclusion crisis resulted in a momentary majority for the Whigs in Par-

liament and a series of bills seeking to exclude James from the succession. For a
description of the crisis, which ended in the collapse of the Whig Party and the
prosecution of many of the Whig leaders, see D. OcG, supra note 24, at 559-656.
72

D. OcG, supra note 24, at 624.
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1023 (2d ed. 1953).

74

Montagu's grandfather was a Puritan gentleman, who was singled out by
Stone as an example of a Puritan landowner exceptionally hostile to the values of
the bourgeoisie. L. STONE, supra note 20, at 157 (1965). His father was a strong
Royalist who paid for his loyalty with a lonely death in the Tower of London in
1644. Montagu followed his father's lead, although he was too young to participate

in the Civil War and was rewarded by being made Lord Chief Baron in 1676.
75

J.

CA

BELL, IV LVEs OF THE CANCELr.oRs

OF ENGLAND,

302, 310 (1857).
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various grounds and with varying degrees of competence and
understanding."
All three of these reliable Tory judges were unwilling to allow
Charles to take under the trust indentures because they were unwilling to abandon ancient ideas about destructibility. Lord North
said very little, and seems to have understood even less. 7' Both
Pemberton and Montagu, however, clearly saw the issue. They
were being asked to abandon the principle of destructibility by
common recovery, one of the traditional checks on perpetuities, and
they were unwilling to do so. Montagu was the most direct: "[I]f
such Limitations over were permitted, it would create Perpetuities,
which the Law doth abhor." 78 Two strong precedents, Sanders v.
Cornish 79 and Child v. Baylie,80 had rejected limitations turning on
a "meer contingency." 81 Moreover, according to Montagu, the
precedents pointing the other way were simply wrong. Montagu
argued that Pells v. Brown had been controverted by Jay v. Jay 82
where, he said, the judge did "confess Pell and Brown's Case to be
adjudged quite contrary to what he argued, yet he tells you, that
the Judges did find such Inconveniences arisen upon it .... ,,83
Accept Pells, argued Montagu, and the ancient legal policy against
the tying up of land had to be abandoned:
Admit that Case to be good Law, where will you stop, if
you admit the Limitation of a Term after an Estate-tail,
where shall it end? For if after one, it may as well be
after two; and if after two, then as well after twenty; for it
may be said, if he die within twenty Years without Issue,
and so if within 100, and there will be no End; and so a
Perpetuity will follow.8- 4
Pemberton agreed with Montagu, although he would have allowed these particular limitations if created by two separate termsY'
He too was conscious of the earlier successes of the conveyancers,
and was especially eloquent in his reaction to Manning's Case:
76 See opinions of Baron Montague, 3 Ch. Cas. at 14, 22 Eng. Rep. at 939;

Lord Chief justice North, id. at 20, 22 Eng. Rep. at 943; Lord Chief Justice
Pemberton, id. at 23, 22 Eng. Rep. at 944; text accompanying notes 77-86 infra.
77 North's opinion may be found at 3 Ch. Cas. at 20, 22 Eng. Rep. at 943.
78 Id. at 17, 22 Eng. Rep. at 946.
79 Cro. Car. 230, 79 Eng. Rep. 801 (1631).
80 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (1618).
813 Ch.Cas. at 18, 22 Eng. Rep. at 941.
82 Style 258, 274, 82 Eng. Rep. 692, 706 (1651).

3 Ch.Cas. at 19, 22 Eng. Rep. at 942.
841d. at 19, 22 Eng. Rep. at 942-43.
83

85 Id. at 23, 22 Eng. Rep. at 945.
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It was not foreseen nor thought, when that Judgment was
given, what would be the Consequence when once there
was an Allowance of the Limitation of a Term after the
Death of a Person; presently it was discerned, there was
the same Reason for after twenty Mens Lives as after one;
and so then it was held and agreed, that so long as the
Limitation exceeded not Lives in Being at the Creation
of the Estate, it should extend so for. . . . and now if
this be admitted, no Man can foresee what an ill Effect
such an ill Allowance might have there, might such Limitations come in as would incumber Estates and mightily
entangle Lands."
If there is a central theme, however, to the three judges' dissents
it seems to stem from the case of Child v. Baylie, decided in 1618.
The case is important because of its similarity to the interests
created by the 1647 trust indenture of the Duke of Norfolk. In
Child v. Baylie, a term of years was bequeathed to one X, but if
X died without issue living at his death, then the term was to go
to Y. Referring to the ghost of perpetuities, the Court of King's
Bench decided that Y's interest was void, despite the fact that Y's
interest would necessarily take effect within X's life. When the
case came before the Exchequer Chamber in 1623, the judges held,
with one strong dissent, that the gift was no different from the
entailing of a term, which was void as a perpetuity. Y's interest
again was held void. Only the strong bias against perpetuities or
ignorance of the law could have produced this result in the face
of counsel's argument that the devise was not a fee tail since the
second interest was to take effect upon the death of X with no living
issue.
Child v. Baylie was the authority, despite many contrary decisions which succeeded it, for judges who wished to hew to the
line favoring maximum alienability and hence maximum destructibility. This was the position of the three dissenting judges. The
arguments forwarded by Montagu, Pemberton and North were the
traditional arguments aimed at the efforts of the conveyancers.
They did not prevail because the Chancellor, who had the only
vote that counted, found the conveyancers' logic more convincing.
Few better examples, of the late seventeenth century Tory can
be found than Heneage Finch, Earl of Nottingham and father of
the Rule Against Perpetuities. He came from a family of solid
Kent gentry, whose senior branch had bought its way into the
s6 Id. at 25, 22 Eng. Rep. at 946.
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peerage during the inflation of honours under the early Stuarts.
Heneage, a son of the cadet branch of the family, married the
daughter of a London merchant, Elizabeth Harvey. During the
Restoration he sat in Parliament, first for Canterbury and then for
Oxford University. Both seats were reliably Tory and Finch's devotion to Anglicanism won him the title of "outstanding Churchman of the Convention" from Sir Keith Feiling, the Tory Party's
historian. 7 Finch's political positions were in keeping with his
party's reputation. He opposed amnesty for the regicides, opposed
the payment to the Puritan poet Milton of some money owed him,
and supported the "Five Mile Act", which prohibited any dissenting
minister from coming within five miles of a market town. s He
generally supported the Royal Court, but was swept up in the antiCatholic enthusiasm of the Popish Plot.s9 In 1680 he sentenced
Lord Stafford, the aging uncle of Henry and Charles Howard, to
death for his alleged role in the plot. Nottingham's staunch Anglicanism had earlier led him to oppose the King in the crisis year of
1673, when Charles sought to win religious toleration for those who
were not members of the Church of England. 90 He supported the
King during the crisis over the succession of James, the Catholic Duke
of York, to the throne, but his true feelings on the issue may have
been reflected by his son's activity in support of "Limitations" on
the Duke of York, a position that James, at any rate, seems to have
regarded as more dangerous than exclusion because it would have
meant the virtual abandonment of Catholicism. 91 In sum, Nottingham's political career reflected classic Tory values, with his first
loyalty always to the Church, not the King.
By 1681 the newly made Earl of Nottingham was in failing
health, and no longer fully trusted by the Crown, which was demanding more complete obedience from its partisans. Some space
has been devoted to discussing Nottingham's political views, and
87 K. FE iNc, supra note 24, at 103.
S8J. CAmPBELL, IV LivEs OF THE CHANCELLORS OF ENGLAND 239-41 (1857).
89 See H. HORwrrz, REVOLUTION PoucIKs: TnE CAREER OF DANIEL FINCH,
SECOND EARL OF NoT-rnGHAl, 1647-1730, at 12 (1968).
90 Daniel, the Earl's son, clearly opposed toleration. See id. 9. According to
Campbell, Nottingham himself once offended Charles II by referring to the "Royal
Coup" of 1673 in a speech to the Commons. J. CAmPBELL, IV LrvEs OF THE
CHANcELL oRs OF ENGLAND 254 (1857). 1673 was a crucial year in English politics,
because Royal initiatives in religion, foreign policy and finance were all opposed by
the Tory dominated Parliament. Charles IIs initiatives ultimately failed and he
was forced to turn to the Earl of Danby, who controlled the House through a
reliably Tory policy. See D. WrrcomBE, Cmnus II AN m CAVALrE HoUsE OF
CoMMoNs 1663-1674, at 166-72 (1966).
91 H. HoRwrrz, supra note 89, at 23.
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those of his colleagues, not because they were determinative of
the case, but rather to illustrate how far removed they were from
the bourgeois or liberal views that were thought to have inspired the
Rule Against Perpetuities. If any values were reflected in Nottingham's thinking, they were almost certainly those of the landed
gentry party to which he belonged.92 Accordingly, his opinions in
The Duke of Norfolk's Case reflect a balanced but generally
tolerant attitude towards the efforts of conveyancers. Nottingham
did refer to certain types of conveyances that he would be unwilling
to countenance because they tended in the direction of a perpetuity; 93 but he saw that the old rule against contingent remainders had been bypassed long since by the conveyancers and
approved by the judges prompted, he suggested, by "the Nature of
Things, and the Necessity of Commerce." 94 These were the very
reasons that might have been offered for allowing the common recovery and holding Charles' interest to have been destroyed. Finch
was, however, perhaps more sympathetic with the problems faced by
a landowner with an heir who was non cornpos mentis, than he was
with the abstract necessity to keep property alienable. Naturally
Nottingham relied heavily on Pells v. Brown and he rejected Child
v. Baylie as a case "that never had any Resolution like it before nor
since." 95 In answer to the fears of the other judges, he refused to
tell them where he would draw the line, saying only that a line
would be drawn when it was needed: "They will perhaps say, where
will you stop, if not at Child and Bayly's Case? Where? why everywhere, where there is not any Inconvenience, any Danger of a
Perpetuity." 90

The definitions found in The Duke of Norfolk's Case are instructive, for they reflect the thinking of Pells v. Brown and
Manning's Case as to what constituted a perpetuity, and why and
when it would be countenanced. An interest in a term for years or
in a freehold estate was, according to the Chancellor, not a perpetuity if the interest conveyed would not last too long, and the test
of "too long" became whatever was inconveniently long. Lord
92 There is one notable exception to Finch's generally Tory views.

His vote in

favor of Irish agricultural imports disgusted his copartisans and was clearly against
the economic interest of the gentry.
93 3 Ch. Cas. at 28-29, 22 Eng. Rep. at 948.
94 Id. at 31, 22 Eng. Rep. at 950.
95 Id. at 35, 22 Eng. Rep. at 952.

96 Id. at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 953. Not surprisingly, a reading of so direct an
opinion has led at least one writer to conclude that "the Duke of Norfolk's Case
was not a restraint on executory interests but an extension." Bordwell, Alienability
and PerpetuitiesVI, 25 IowA L. REv. 707, 722 (1940).

44

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126: 19

Nottingham noted with approval the decision in Pells v. Brown,
where the fee simple was cut short by an executory interest in the
lifetime of a living person: such a "Fee upon a Fee" was clearly
permissible.9 7 Another case cited in Nottingham's opinion was
Cotton v. Heath,9 s which involved an 18-year term to A followed by
a remainder to B for life, remainder to the first issue of B for life.
The Chancellor stated that "this Contingent upon a Contingent was
allowed to be good, because it would wear out in a short Time." 99
Wood v. Sanders,1 00 decided in 1669, was also cited with approval by
Nottingham because the case involved a contingency that would
take effect within two lives in being. Nottingham applauded
Wood v. Sanders, which was decided by Sir Orlando Bridgman
himself and the Earl referred to Bridgman with "great Reverance
and Veneration for his Learning and Integrity." 101
Lord Nottingham evidently wished to permit some tying up
of land by the "dead hand" and was willing to concede that the
ability to control the future ownership of land for at least one lifetime, and probably two, was something the law should allow. What
evolved from his decision, however, was not a rule for perpetuities,
but a rule of perpetuities. Admittedly, Charles' interest in the
term for years was not destructible, but neither should it be void
because Charles' interest would "wear itself out" in a single lifetime.
Lord Nottingham's resolution of the perpetuities problem was the
kind of decision that would please Tory landowners of the 1680's.
These landowners did not want complete destructibility, which
could ruin the family estate in a generation. They did want freedom to transfer land, but they also wanted some means of protecting the family from lunatics, wastrels, gamblers, and the like by
maintaining some degree of control over the future disposition of
the land. Lord Nottingham provided them with a compromise
between complete alienability and the power to tie up land for a
perpetuity. Nottingham's successors were to give even more power
to the dead hand, so that in the end the conveyancers and their
clients prevailed. What the Chancellor did was consistent with
the thinking behind Manning's Case, which validated certain
future interests in terms for years and, more importantly, with the
logic of Pells v. Brown, which had upheld the indestructibility of
executory interests.
97 Id.

98 1 Roll. Ab. 612, Pollex 26, 86 Eng. Rep. 500 (1638).
99 Id. at 35, 22 Eng. Rep. at 952.
1001 Ch. Cas. 131, 22 Eng. Rep. 728 (1669).
101 3 Ch. Cas. at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 953.
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Nottingham in effect affirmed Pells v. Brown though he did not
say so explicitly, and thereby laid to rest the doubts that judges
nourished about the case for sixty years. The dissent by Doderidge
in Pells had reflected the deep-seated conviction that, unless executory interests continued to be freely destructible, freedom of
alienation would be curtailed and mischievous perpetuities would
be encouraged. The underlying principle of Doderidge's dissent,
as above noted, led many judges to repent of the decision and even
to favor its reversal. What Nottingham did in relying on Pells v.
Brown was to underscore the fact that William Brown Jr.'s indestructible executory interest in that decision would necessarily
take effect within the life of a single person, namely his brother
Thomas. Nottingham viewed Charles' executory interest in The
Duke of Norfolk's Case in a similar light: Charles' interest would
take effect, if at all, within Thomas' lifetime and hence there
existed no perpetuity.
From the standpoint of the evolution of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, the decision in Pells v. Brown probably did require
the eventual formulation of the rule, as has often been asserted; 102
but ironically Pells provided Lord Nottingham with a very strong
precedent for formulating in its initial form the essence of a rule
that depends on a measuring life. The Chancellor's definition of
a perpetuity as an interest that might exceed the duration of some
measuring life was but a small step from the modem definition of a
perpetuity as an interest that will not necessarily take effect within
a life or lives in being and twenty-one years. The judges of succeeding decades were to formulate the rule in its modem form, but
Lord Nottingham effectively took the first step in holding Charles'
interest to be valid. Three respectable Tory judges had found the
danger of a perpetuity in The Duke of Norfolk's Case, but the Earl
of Nottingham saw it differently. The dead hand of the Earl of
Arundel needed more room and, aided by Heneage Finch and Sir
Orlando Bridgman, it reached back into the world of the living. A
great family had to be protected from the control of a lunatic. "It
was Prudence in the Earl to take care." 103
IV.

CONCLUSION

It would be too extravagant to state unequivocally that the
Earl of Nottingham's decision in The Duke of Norfolk's Case was
influenced in whole, or even in part, by his perception of the
102 J. GRAY, supra note 7, § 121.7.
103 3 Ch. Cas. at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 953.
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interests of the landed ruling class to which he belonged. The
Earl did speak of inconvenience as a test for perpetuities, and he
praised the prudence of Orlando Bridgman, one of the greatest
ornaments of his profession. These are sentiments that one might
expect from a landed gentleman familiar with the need to protect
estates, but they can not be said to prove Nottingham's motive for
deciding as he did. More probably the Chancellor saw himself as a
rationalizer of the confused law of estates and future interests, producing a result that fulfilled a need of the law rather than the
interest of any given class. Moreover, the interests of the law and
of the landed class were not entirely clear. The common law
judges, North, Pemberton and Montagu, were landed gentry of
prominent families, and yet they saw in the Earl of Arundel's trust
the spectre of perpetuity that they opposed as inimical to both
their class and the law. It is perhaps enough to say to them that
time proved Nottingham right. No truly permanent perpetuity
haunted the land, and the gentry prospered in the eighteenth
century.
If the motivation of the creator of the rule, or that of its opponents, may never be entirely clear, it can at least be suggested
that the reasons for the rule are not as simple as has been believed.
The test of a "life in being", and later a "life in being and twentyone years," was ultimately a compromise, as any limit on the power
of a draftsman must be. Compromises generally emerge when an
existing structure yields to a rising force. The existing legal structure of the seventeenth century was not one of unchecked perpetuities, but a rigid, already weakened system in which future
interests could be found destructible or void and present owners
were often comparatively free to break their parents' wills. The
rising force of seventeenth century England was not a new
capitalist ethic that demanded an end to perpetuities, but a spirit
of tolerance for the needs of an increasingly dominant landed class
that desperately needed more room to maneuver in order to secure
its own future. The rule meant that what had once been considered a perpetuity was one no longer. In this sense the new rule
was a clear victory for the "dead hand", not for free alienability.
The rule served the fathers, not the sons and if it did not attempt to
make lawful a whole panoply of perpetuities, it did at least allow
most that were needed.

